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ABSTRACT
The paper considers what it means to contest austerity and what political
contestation of austerity says about how austerity as a political process
should be conceived. It does so through separating a narrow view of
austerity as fiscal consolidation from actually existing austerity as a
broader political economic process ongoing in different ways in different
countries. Through a case study of crisis, austerity and contestation as it
relates to housing in Spain, the paper argues that to contest actually
existing austerity it is necessary to contest both the wealth and power
of the actors that have gained from austerity, not least finance capital.
Through bank bailouts and the creation of a bad bank, the reforms
demanded by the troika have opened up Spanish housing to direct
wealth extraction by global finance capital whilst half a million
households have been evicted and hundreds of thousands live with
insurmountable debt. The Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca
(PAH, Platform for the Mortgage-Affected) has contested austerity in
Spanish housing by contesting finance capital through civil
disobedience whilst campaigning for anti-austerity reforms to housing
and mortgage legislation, aiming to limit how housing can be a sphere
of wealth extraction for finance capital.
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The concept of austerity has dominated debates about the political economy in many European
countries since the 2008 crisis. It is a term sometimes used by proponents, but more often by
opponents and commentators, to describe attempts to cut national debt in relation to Gross Dom-
estic Product (GDP) by decreasing expenditure on welfare and public services whilst increasing
some taxes in the wake of the 2008 crisis (Blyth 2013, Konzelmann 2014). Throughout the post-
2008 period austerity has been critiqued on multiple grounds, including that it is not achieving its
stated aims (Guajardo et al. 2014); that it is a fundamentally flawed idea that will necessarily
worsen the problems that it is supposed to solve (Konzelmann 2014); that it is having devastating
effects on public health (Karanikolos et al. 2013, Legido-Quigley et al. 2013); that it entrenches
gender inequalities and disproportionately affects already disadvantaged groups of women (Griffin
2015, Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage 2016); and even that it constitutes the end of democratic
capitalism because capitalism no longer provides enough for enough people to sustain it democra-
tically (Schäfer and Streeck 2013, Streeck 2014, 2016). Political contestation of austerity has taken
many forms in this period, including the 15M, or Indignados, protests in Spain in 2011 (Hughes
2011, Castañeda 2012); an increase in various forms of anti-austerity social movement activity
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across Europe (Della Porta 2015, Giugni and Grasso 2015, Bailey et al. 2016; Flesher Fominaya 2017,
Hayes 2017); the rise of new anti-austerity parties in Greece and Spain (Kioupkiolis 2016, Ramiro and
Gomez 2016); and the relative success of the Labour Party on an anti-austerity platform in the 2017
UK General Election (Berry 2017).
With this increased intellectual critique and political contestation, the commitment to austerity
has decreased amongst some key actors. This has been true for the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) for some years (Guajardo et al. 2014, Farnsworth and Irving 2016, Ostry et al. 2016) and it
was visible in the differing opinions on maintaining a below-inflation pay cap for public sector
workers amongst British Government Ministers following the 2017 election (McCann 2017). In the
context of this mounting opposition to aspects of austerity, pertinent questions to ask are what it
means for austerity to end and what it means to politically contest austerity.
This paper considers what it means to contest austerity and what political contestation of aus-
terity says about how austerity as a political process should be conceived. It does so through sep-
arating a narrow view of austerity as fiscal consolidation from actually existing austerity as a broader
political economic process ongoing in different ways in different countries. Other authors have
noted how actually existing austerity is variegated (Jessop 2015) and that it matters whether it is
externally enforced or driven by domestic political forces (Stanley 2016). Through a case study of
crisis, austerity and contestation as it relates to housing in Spain, the paper argues that to
contest actually existing austerity it is necessary to contest both the wealth and power of the
actors that have gained from austerity, not least finance capital. Any claims to end austerity that
stay short of such contestation fail to address the growing inequalities that are at the core of actu-
ally existing austerity.
The paper conceives of actually existing austerity as the neoliberal political economic response to
the 2008 crisis. In addition to fiscal consolidation, this includes reforms like the bank bailouts, labour-
market reforms towards further casualisation, Quantitative Easing (QE) and the political changes that
has enabled these reforms, not least the creation of the troika of the European Commission, the Euro-
pean Central Bank and the IMF. This broader view of what actually existing austerity is, emphasising
questions of power and wealth inequality, makes sense when exploring political contestation of aus-
terity because the aforementioned anti-austerity actors oppose more than fiscal consolidation per se.
The paper focuses on Spanish housing because the anti-eviction housing movement Plataforma
de Afectados por la Hipoteca (PAH, Platform for the Mortgage-Affected) has been one of the most sus-
tained and well-known cases of contestation of austerity in Europe throughout the post-2008 period,
with scholars across the social sciences exploring different aspects of the PAH and its campaigns
(Álvarez de Andrés et al. 2015, Flesher Fominaya 2015, Nuijten 2015, Ordóñez et al. 2015, de
Weerdt and García 2016, Vásquez-Vera et al. 2016). It therefore follows Huke et al. (2015) to some
extent in understanding the political economy by exploring how it is contested and disrupted.
Housing in Spain may seem a counterintuitive choice because it is not directly related to fiscal con-
solidation issues such as public sector pay, pensions, public services or welfare provisions. However,
as the paper will show, it has been central to actually existing austerity in Spain where externally
imposed reforms have facilitated further wealth extraction from Spanish housing and benefited
global finance to the detriment of Spanish households. The paper consequently focuses on the
PAH, its demands and what they reveal about contestation of actually existing austerity.
The first section sets out what actually existing austerity is in and beyond Spain by showing how it
has grown inequalities more than strengthened state finances through fiscal consolidation. The
second section specifically shows how actually existing austerity in Spanish housing is not an efficient
way of bolstering state finances, but that it works in the interests of global finance capital at the
expense of Spanish workers, both as households and as taxpayers, and extends the housing crisis
rather than solving it. The third section accounts for the PAH as a political actor and its role within
broader Spanish contestation of austerity. The fourth section then analyses the PAH’s demands




This section argues that it is necessary to differentiate between austerity as deficit reduction or fiscal
consolidation and actually existing austerity as a political economic process intrinsically linked to
power relations and growing inequalities. As an idea or macroeconomic strategy, austerity has
come to be widely critiqued, whilst only defended by a minority of scholars studying it. This dominant
critique of austerity in the academy (e.g. King et al. 2012, Krugman 2012, Blyth 2013, Guajardo et al.
2014, Konzelmann 2014) and its lacking success to influence policy shows how it is necessary to move
beyond a view of austerity as a means of achieving a cut in the debt-to-GDP ratio and stable GDP
growth by cutting spending. The critique, from both neoclassical and Keynesian macroeconomists,
has undermined the case for austerity but failed to influence policy, revealing two limitations to it.
Because it lacks analyses of power or class relations, this critique is unable to explain why it is not
gaining more influence in policy circles. The failure to influence policy also makes evident that
such critique of austerity as a kind of fiscal policy can achieve little without political contestation
of actually existing austerity.
Actually existing austerity (henceforth austerity) is a neoliberal response to the 2008 crisis and
therefore intrinsically linked to questions of power, inequality and class relations. Many authors
note austerity’s neoliberal characteristics ‘selectively targeting the social state’ (Peck 2012: 626)
or its roots in neo-classical economic theory (Stanley 2016). That austerity is more than fiscal
adjustment has also been noted by Meegan et al. (2014: 137) who observe both roll-out neoliber-
alisation, ‘as the state asserts market rules in more and more spheres of social life’, and roll-back
neoliberalisation, ‘deregulation of state activity in the interests of markets and profit-making, pri-
vatisation of public assets and cutbacks in public expenditure on public services’. In other words,
fiscal adjustment is part of the story but not the whole story. As others have argued, neolibera-
lisation is often crisis-induced, meaning that it is intensified during and following crises because
political opportunities arise that can make possible what was previously politically impossible
(Klein 2007, Mirowski 2013). In this case, the crisis has provided an opportunity for external
actors to dictate policy in a way similar to the way in which countries in the Global South had
to endure Structural Adjustment Programmes in exchange for IMF loans from the 1980s
onwards (Fine 2001). The troika, as a new regulatory setup, has created, or at least reinforced,
the existence of a European periphery (Spain, Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Italy). The govern-
ments in the peripheral countries have with varying degree of enthusiasm had to impose austerity
measures largely designed by the troika in exchange for access to credit. Austerity reforms in
Europe are therefore partly made possible by a transfer of power from the legislatures and
voters in the European South to the troika.
Rather than strengthening state finances, reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio or producing stable
growth, austerity has primarily increased inequalities in both wealth and power. As Jeremy
Green and Scott Lavery (2015: 894) have shown in relation to the United Kingdom, the combi-
nation of QE and labour-market reform has resulted in ‘rising asset wealth for the few, and
falling living standards alongside increasing economic insecurity for wage earners’. The authors
point to asset holders and businesses as the beneficiaries of these policies and particularly
finance capital in the form of the British banks and their major shareholders as the direct receivers
of the wealth created by QE. Wealth inequality in the form of wage-freezes and stagnation are
accompanied and aided by increasing power inequalities between workers and employers as
casualisation increases (Friedman 2014, Adams et al. 2015) and the threshold for workers to
strike is increased (UK Parliament 2015). Although Stanley (2016) is right in separating the ‘disci-
plinary’ or forced austerity of the periphery countries from the ‘anticipatory’ or voluntary austerity
of the UK, reforms that lead to growing inequalities in wealth and power have been central to
austerity overall. The rest of this paper will show this in relation to austerity reforms to
housing in Spain.
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The actually existing austerity of housing in Spain
The reforms carried out in relation to Spanish housing have intensified the transfer of wealth and
power from workers, as households and taxpayers, to Spanish and global finance capital. They
have boosted capital profits and opened up Spanish land and real estate to global financial investors
at discount prices. This has happened in the context of a housing crisis where half a million house-
holds have lost their homes and hundreds of thousands are burdened with unsurmountable debts as
a result of defaulting on their mortgages. Analysing these politics reveals that the bank bailouts and
the further banking reforms are central to Spanish austerity and the way in which Spanish households
suffer the consequences.
The housing crisis has been at the centre of the broader crisis in Spanish political economy since
2008 with foreclosures, repossessions and evictions being some of the main ways in which the crisis
has hit many Spanish people (Cano Fuentes et al. 2013, Barbero 2015, Vásquez-Vera et al. 2016). More-
over, Spanish growth preceding the crisis was largely driven by increasing house prices (López and
Rodríguez 2010, Charnock et al. 2014). Exact numbers on repossessions and evictions have proved
difficult to produce but a conservative estimate based on data from the banks and courts is that
there were between 2008 and 2015 at least 500,000 evictions, out of which at least 250,000 are
the result of mortgage repossessions (Banco de España 2014, CGPJ 2016).
The institutional response to the crisis has been to let Spanish households absorb the losses. The
particularly punitive Spanish legislation that does not have allowances for personal bankruptcy
means that hundreds of thousands of foreclosed homeowners remain burdened with debt following
from their negative equity (Cano Fuentes et al. 2013). In Spain, when a foreclosure process is carried
out, the property is auctioned. Since there is such an abundance of properties in Spain, there are
rarely any buyers and the property instead goes to the lending bank who pays the borrower a set
percentage of the purchase value; an amount which was 50 per cent but was raised to 70 per
cent as a result of the PAH’s campaigns (Sosa Troya 2013). Because many of those having their
homes repossessed had a high loan-to-value ratio, the mortgage debt – particularly after legal
fees and the penalty fees incurred as a result of debt defaulting are included – is generally larger
than the payment from the bank from the auction. This leaves a debt that can amount to hundreds
of thousands of Euros once the home has been repossessed (Amnistía Internacional España 2015: 23).
What has characterised austerity as a political economic process as it relates to housing in Spain has
been that these punitive policies towards workers as households have been accompanied by
opening Spanish housing up for global finance capital investment.
The bank bailouts, or bank restructuring programmes, have benefited the banking sector as awhole
at the expense of Spanish taxpayers. The bailouts have taken place in three stages and have amounted
to €61bn (García Montalvo 2014: 510). To put this figure into perspective, it equals 4.2 per cent of
Spanish GDP, 3.6 per cent of government debt or 9.5 per cent of yearly government spending (com-
pared to figures fromOECD 2013). Amore politically relevant comparison is perhaps that the bank bail-
outs amount to roughly double ofwhat it would cost to bail out foreclosed Spanish households (€28bn)
by pardoning the mortgages that are not being serviced (Banco de España 2016). The restructuring of
the banking system has also led to greater involvement of global finance capital. Previously, the
Spanish state has made efforts to keep the big banks under Spanish ownership (Charnock et al.
2014: 68) and mediate global investment through nationally owned banks or locally owned savings
banks (2014: 91). As part of the restructuring, direct investment by global finance capital has in contrast
been seen as a necessity in order to get toxic assets off bank balance sheets. The bank bailouts have
benefited finance capital beyond those banks immediately rescued. An example of the wider
benefit of the bailout is Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA), Spain’s second largest bank after San-
tander and fourth largest company overall (Bolsa de Madrid 2015). BBVA has never received bailout
money directly, but they have purchased both Unnim and Catalunya Banc for discounted prices, the
former for €1, who together were bailed out for a total of €13bn (García Montalvo 2014: 509). In
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mergers such as these, billions of euros have already been lost since the purchasing institution does not
take on the debt to the taxpayer.
A condition on behalf of the troika for the rescue packages was to set up Sareb (La Sociedad de
Gestión de Activos Procedentes de la Reestructuración Bancaria, Bank Restructuring Asset Management
Society), which is what in economic literature and common parlance is known as a ‘bad bank’ (Hauck
et al. 2015) but which is officially called an asset management company (Byrne 2015, Sareb 2016). The
purpose of a bad bank is, for its proponents, to get banks to lend and thereby avoid a credit crunch
and recession. This is deemed necessary in situations where banks have a lot of toxic assets on their
books, like the Spanish banks had in the form of both defaulted loans and unsold properties at differ-
ent levels of development. It is called bad because of the bad quality of the assets that it purchases
from the banks. Because of these bad assets, a bad bank is certainly in the short term and possibly in
the long-term bad business. It is therefore funded by taxpayer money and constitutes one way in
which taxpayers bail out banks. As with the bank bailouts in general, the creation of bad banks is jus-
tified by the ‘systemic importance’ (Hauck et al. 2015: 125) of commercial banks because their lending
is necessary to fuel continued consumption and growth. Creating a bad bank is a nationalisation of
assets, but only those which are unlikely to return a profit in the short to medium term. It is then one
way in which, under austerity, losses are socialised but profits are not.
Sareb has become the main tool through which the crisis has enabled a large increase in global
financial actors’ direct ownership of Spanish land and real estate, something which is creating a more
direct wealth extraction from Spanish households by global finance. Sareb was founded in 2012 as
part of the third and largest restructuring of the Spanish banks. Its creation was a condition of the
troika for the rescue package but it is important to note that although EU and IMF funds made
the creation possible, the burden of payment lies with the Spanish taxpayers. Sareb is 45 per cent
funded by the Spanish state and 55 per cent funded by various Spanish banks, some of whom
have been part-nationalised (Sareb 2016). The minority state ownership means that it is privately con-
trolled but, because some of the private owners have themselves been rescued, Spanish taxpayers
are behind a majority of the funds. With these funds Sareb purchased 200,000 toxic assets from
Spanish banks, at 47 per cent of their original value, of which just over half were real estate assets
and the rest were loans (IMF 2014: 43). These included 76,000 empty houses and 61,000 loans to
properties already built (Mendez 2013). As Byrne (2015) notes, this makes Sareb the largest holder
of real estate assets in Europe, followed by its Irish counterpart. The consequence is that although
it is an economic creation aimed at stabilising banks, Sareb is an important political actor able to
dictate housing policy by deciding who can buy all their empty housing and for what price.
Sareb only sells properties to large-scale investors (García Lamarca 2016: 135–141), meaning that it
uses its power over Spanish housing to open it up for global finance capital at heavily discounted
prices. Sareb is therefore the mechanism through which the previously largely nationally owned
Spanish real estate stock is purchased by global actors taking advantage of the Spanish housing
crisis, giving it a significant political role. Demanded by the troika, Sareb serves to use the crisis as
an opportunity to transfer ownership of mainly urban land and housing from Spanish hands to
those of global financial institutions. This makes Sareb’s position complicated in the way that it
blurs the line between state and finance capital. On the one hand, Sareb is meant to return a
long-term profit from its sales to benefit the Spanish taxpayers and the Spanish banks. On the
other hand, it is designed to open Spanish housing to the wealth extraction of global finance
capital. Time will tell if it achieves the former, but it is already delivering on the latter.
Sareb plays the role of the broker in the new kinds of opportunities for vulture investments under
austerity and the rise of what has been termed ‘global corporate landlords’ (Beswick et al. 2016).
Vulture investments are the buying of cheap assets in a crisis with the expectation of long-term profit-
ability. House prices in many countries fell in and after the 2008 crisis, and in some countries the fall
was dramatic with Ireland and Spain experiencing the worst devaluations (Cano Fuentes et al. 2013:
1204). The result of falling prices has not been to make housing more affordable and an expansion in
home ownership. High unemployment, falling wages and stricter lending practices have instead led
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to falls in homeownership ratios in the affected markets and an increase in renting. In some markets
this has happened in the context of large-scale investments by private equity firms in housing. In
Spain, these vulture investments in distressed housing assets are still in their early stages but in
the United States some of the implications of these investments for households are clearer.
Blackstone is one of several, but the largest, investor in distressed housing assets in the US and the
one with the clearest European presence with investments in Ireland, Spain and other European
countries (Beswick et al. 2016). In the US, Blackstone and other investors have become landlords
in that they rent out housing rather than wait for it to become profitable to sell. In only a few
years, the corporate landlords came to manage 1.5 per cent, or 200,000 homes, of single-family
rental properties across the US, homes which are heavily concentrated in certain areas, such as
Phoenix, Atlanta and Los Angeles (Fields 2014: 5). Becoming large-scale landlords has enabled the
vulture funds to create rental-backed securities, a new form of financial product that can be
traded on global financial markets (2014: 9). Interviews with tenants of corporate landlords and exam-
inations of their contracts have shown that having a corporate landlord decreases both affordability
and the security of the tenancy, since rents are often higher and corporate landlords show less
leniency. It makes the tenant–landlord relationship much less personal with almost all contact
managed online (Call et al. 2014).
From the perspective of households there are reasons to be concerned by the increase in corpor-
ate involvement in rental housing. Politically, a smaller number of larger capital actors can be
expected to have greater influence over policy than larger numbers of smaller companies or individ-
ual landlords. Concentrated ownership is therefore likely to be detrimental for tenants’ rights in the
long term since it will be in the interest of corporate actors to diminish these rights. What ‘the Black-
stone Connection’ (Beswick et al. 2016: 323) illustrates is how the relationship between finance capital
and workers under austerity is becoming much more direct. By being landlords and evicting house-
holds that do not comply with the rules set, vulture funds enter a direct relationship as extractors of
wealth from workers as households as well as enabling direct speculation on rental income through
rental-backed securities.
Developments in the Spanish market are at an earlier stage but it is possible to discern some indi-
cations of Blackstone’s business model in Spain and its effects on Spanish households. By 2015, global
finance capital actors had invested €3 billion of restructuring investments, much of it through Sareb,
but some of it directly with Spanish banks (García Lamarca 2016: 141). In 2016 and 2017 it has
become clear that Blackstone seeks to become a corporate landlord in Spain too, where it has
created the company Anticipa Real Estate. As of May 2017, Anticipa owns 12,000 buildings across
the country with particular concentration in Catalonia (Ruiz 2017). The fact that Blackstone is yet
to create rental-backed securities in Spain indicates that Blackstone is not yet an established landlord
in Spain. Nevertheless, it means that if the plans do go ahead, Spanish households can expect a more
direct relationship with the vulture fund. The Spanish government has helped to shape this relation-
ship partly by enabling so-called express evictions in 2014 (Colina Garea 2014), making it easier and
quicker for landlords to evict tenants.
The type of securities that Blackstone has issued in Spain is those made up by re-performing mort-
gages, something which is likely to increase the wealth extraction from Spanish households. In late
2016 and early 2017, Blackstone has issued two such packages (Bell 2017). This is a product particu-
larly well-suited to the punitive Spanish mortgage legislation set out above where part of the mort-
gage debt stays with the borrower permanently even after repossession and eviction. It is therefore
probable that these new securities are in part made up by household debt that is no longer con-
nected to an asset. These products are even more problematic when you consider that securitisation
has a history of creating demand for serviced debt. The profitable trade in mortgage-backed securi-
ties led to a demand for sub-prime mortgages in many countries leading up to the 2008 crisis, Spain
included. This demand contributed to aggressive and sometimes illegal practices where brokers
secured mortgages to borrowers that would otherwise not qualify for a mortgage (Colau and
Alemany 2012: 68). Now that there is a demand for re-performing mortgages, the PAH and its
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members know only too well how banks seek to make defaulted households pay. In my interviews
with affected households many respondents have told me about telephone harassment from banks
and their debt collectors. One respondent said that,
there were sometimes forty phone calls daily, from eight in the morning until ten at night… but the calls to me
weren’t the worst. It was the ones to my mother as the guarantor. I was thinking, she’s ill and on top of that she
finds herself in this situation and it’s my fault because all she did was trying to help me… and unlike me she
didn’t hang up, she tried to explain the situation to them and it really distressed her when they didn’t listen. (Inter-
view 1)
Other respondents told me about their children taking phone calls (Interview 2), being threatened
with prison or threatened to have their children removed by social services (Observation 1). Accord-
ing to the PAH’s Blackstone co-ordinator, Anticipa has proven as aggressive in these practices as
other banks (Interview 3). Moreover, Blackstone has proven much less willing to negotiate than
the Spanish banks that previously held their debts (Interview 3).
The negotiations themselves are a significant difference between dealing with Blackstone and
dealing with a bank. Whilst other PAH members go to their bank to assert pressure aimed at
pushing the negotiations of debt alleviation and social housing forward, Blackstone ask their bor-
rowers to call a designated phone line. The company has set up one office in Catalonia but this is
located in an industrial area outside of Barcelona and they only receive people on appointment (Inter-
view 3). Relations between borrowers and Blackstone are impersonal and it has thus far proven diffi-
cult to get Blackstone to move from their original offer, mirroring the experience of tenants in the US
who experience a less personal and less lenient relationship to corporate landlords.
With their innovative practices, using the specific economic and legal situation in Spain to their
advantage and looking for new forms of wealth extraction, Blackstone and other vulture funds are
drivers as well as beneficiaries of austerity. They are using Sareb and the restructuring of Spanish
banking as part of the austerity reforms to buy large amounts of land and property at discounted
prices with the expectation of being able to extract wealth from future buyers or tenants in those
properties whilst profiting from new financial products. These new forms of securities also open
Spanish real estate up in a new way for wider investment by global finance capital. In this way,
the troika, the Spanish government and the vulture funds are drivers of a process of austerity that
benefits global finance capital more broadly as the trade in securities based on re-performing mort-
gages is traded on global markets. Individual households have less means of exerting pressure on a
vulture fund than on a Spanish high street bank. Austerity has therefore not only meant a transfer of
wealth from Spanish workers to finance capital, but also a transfer of power and decreased opportu-
nity to contest the wealth transfer. To contest this austerity in Spanish housing, it is necessary to
contest both the wealth and the power of finance capital, which is what the PAH does.
The PAH
In the multi-faceted political contestation of austerity in Spain, the PAH stands out as a particularly
politically relevant grassroots actor that contests austerity in the sphere of housing and debt
through a combination of institutional politics with attempts to change the law and frequent use
of civil disobedience. The PAH has become an important political actor in its own right. This is
evident in its many campaigns to change the law at national and regional levels that have thus far
been stopped by the central government but that nonetheless have led to broad public and party
political support for reforms to housing and mortgage legislation (Metroscopia 2013, Baquero
2015). It is also evident in the election of its co-founder and previous spokesperson Ada Colau as
mayor of Barcelona in 2015.
Observing that the housing and mortgage crisis was at the centre of how Spanish people were
being affected by the crisis, the PAH was founded in Barcelona in 2009. Through its participation
with 15M it became a national movement with over 200 local groups across the country in 2011
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(Colau and Alemany 2013). In 2013, the PAH collected 1.4 million signatures in a campaign to change
mortgage and housing legislation nationally, carried out so called escraches, whereby protests were
brought to the front door of governing party MPs (Romanos 2013) and won a European Parliament
Citizens’ Prize despite openly disobeying laws (European Parliament 2013). This led to national pro-
minence and appearances by Ada Colau in parliament on multiple TV shows and in international
news media (e.g. NY Times 2013, BBC 2014).
The PAH has become famous for its combination of innovative and disobedient forms of protest
and more traditional attempts to change the law through collecting signatures and lobbying
members of national and regional parliaments. The three most common forms of civil disobedience
have been organised squatting for households that have been rendered homeless, physically stop-
ping evictions by building human shields in the doorway and temporarily occupying bank branches
with specific demands of debt alleviation and social housing for individual households. Blackstone
(PAH 2015a) and Sareb (PAH 2016b) have been particularly targeted in the PAH’s civil disobedience
campaigns to the point where the PAH seeks out empty buildings belonging to Sareb for occupation
by homeless households. The civil disobedience campaigns, which have resulted in many households
achieving debt alleviation and/or social housing, support the more traditional ways of seeking legal
changes. It has thus been possible to engage in forms of protest that are connected with the more
radical left, such as squatting, in a way that the majority of the public nonetheless see as legitimate
(Metroscopia 2013).
In the turbulent political landscape in Catalonia and Spain, the PAH seeks to be party politically
independent but, in reality, stands closer to some of the parties. The most obvious connection is
with En Comù, the Catalonian anti-austerity formation with a commitment to more direct forms of
democracy and participation. En Comù was co-founded by Colau and other leading PAH members
along with many others and several previous PAH activists now represent the formation at different
levels or have gone into local government administration (Blanchar 2015). Whilst the connections to
En Comùmay be interpreted as compromising the movement’s independence, the PAH is keen to say
that Colau’s local government is better than previous ones but does not do enough to provide
housing for the city’s dwellers (Congostrina 2017). The critique of the lack of housing measures of
Madrid’s left-wing government is in contrast more severe (Interview 4). The relationship to
Podemos is also somewhat complex at times. Whilst Podemos support most of the PAH’s policies,
there is a critique against what is experienced as a tendency to appropriate policies and language
of the PAH without giving the movement due recognition (Interview 5). When it comes to Catalonian
independence, the PAH is neutral and, in my experience of talking to activists, they take a range of
stances on the issue. In short, the PAH and its former and current activists have played central roles in
Spain and Catalonia’s broader political contestation of austerity.
Contesting actually existing austerity
The PAH contests austerity trough the civil disobedience campaigns that directly contest the retail
banks, Sareb and the vulture funds as agents and drivers of austerity. Moreover, the movement’s
suggested changes to housing and debt legislation show what anti-austerity housing politics
would look like (PAH 2015b, 2016a) since the changes that the PAH seeks would decrease the pos-
sibilities of capital to profit from housing; increase the power of tenants and borrowers vis-à-vis large-
scale landlords and banks; and increase the role of the state in guaranteeing access to housing. The
suggested legal changes, or demands, are debt pardoning, a stop to evictions, expanded social
housing and greater protection for tenants. This section will explore these demands closer
because it is through studying contestation that it becomes clear that to end austerity, it is necessary
to contest inequalities and the wealth and the power of finance capital.
The first of the PAH’s demands is debt pardoning, which would contest austerity to a significant
extent and benefit indebted household at the expense of banks. It does not only seek to impose this
change on new mortgage contracts, but would also apply it to existing contracts and cases where
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foreclosure and eviction have already taken place. This makes it a retroactive law, applicable to con-
tracts signed before the existence of the law itself. Under current legislation the bank is left with two
assets after a foreclosure and eviction, the property in question and the outstanding mortgage loan
after the deductions following the auction. Apart from the pertaining payments, a lender can also
profit from an outstanding loan by securitising it as set out above. Under the PAH’s proposal, the
loss in value of the property since it was purchased by the borrower would be assumed by the
lender. Whilst the lending institution here retains the property asset, it would lose the asset that
the loan constitutes. As of the third quarter of 2015, the total amount of ‘doubtful’ household
loans, where payments have been missed, related to house purchases and renovations was €28
billion. This figure constitutes 5 per cent of all mortgage loans, 21 per cent of all doubtful loans
held by Spanish banks and 2 per cent of all bank lending (Banco de España 2016). This figure is
the best available to estimate the balance sheet loss for the banks if this was made law. It is a
balance sheet loss rather than a direct loss since the value of such doubtful loans when traded on
financial markets is much lower, incorporating the significant risk that the loans will never be
repaid in full. The proposal would also limit the scope for loan securitisation by removing the riskiest
loans from the market. It would then be a solution that leaves the hundreds of thousands of house-
holds that have experienced foreclosure better off to the detriment of the banks and finance capital
that profit from trade in securities, whilst avoiding asking the state and taxpayers to cover the losses
of the banks.
The second of the PAH’s demands is to stop evictions. The demand does not imply an absolute
stop to all evictions and all opportunities for landlords and financial institutions to gain control
over a property, but rather qualifies the way in which this can be achieved, by guaranteeing that
households do not become homeless. The central part of the demand is a moratorium on evictions
regarding primary and only residences, regardless of whether these are foreclosed homes or rented.
This means that an eviction may be executed if the household has an alternative residence and if an
alternative residence in the form of social housing, where the household would pay a maximum of 30
per cent of their income in rent, can be arranged. When it comes to deciding who carries the respon-
sibility for securing that social housing, it depends on who the owner of the property is. In cases
where the owner is a financial institution or large-scale landlord, they have an obligation to offer
social housing, which may be in the same property or another suitable property in their ownership.
Suitable here means that the home should fit the size of the household and that the household has
the right to remain in the local area. In cases of small-scale landlords, the onus lies on the local auth-
ority to guarantee the right to housing by providing financial support towards the rent. In the last
instance it is the public administration that carries the responsibility to re-house people in suitable
homes, even in cases of squatting (PAH 2015b). The demand to stop evictions would not guarantee
all households the right to stay where they are, but it would make sure that nobody is made homeless
and that there therefore would be no need for forced evictions. This contests austerity in multiple
ways, not least by transferring power from financial institutions and large-scale landlords to house-
holds. It does not constitute the challenge to bank balance sheets that the debt pardoning does since
there is an abundance of empty property in Spain, much of it in hands of the banks and of the bad
bank Sareb (Byrne 2015). Considering this excess of supply, it is not necessarily bad business for banks
to rent out housing, even at the lower rate of social housing. What stopping evictions would do is to
undermine the control that banks and landlords have over their properties, whilst empowering poor
households by removing a significant threat that they currently face. Stopping evictions would be an
infringement on current property rights since proprietors would be less free to use their properties in
ways that they see fit and to maximise profits. Not least, it would significantly affect the power
balance between financial institutions or landlords and individual households. Removing the
threat to evict would have an empowering effect on households, who would not have to fear becom-
ing homeless as a result of poverty.
The PAH’s third demand is an expanded stock of social housing. The expansion of social housing
will involve public investment, but the PAH’s demand stresses that the state should appropriate
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empty or idle housing in the hands of financial institutions and put it to social use by converting it
into social housing. Short of appropriating, the PAH also demands that large-scale property owners
be fined for possessing empty property rather than offering social housing. These significant altera-
tions to current property rights are justified by reference to the bailout of the Spanish banks by the
tax payers. The PAH’s discourse in justifying these changes is that the housing stock is there and that
the state should demand that the financial institutions put it to the use of the people as compen-
sation for the bank bailout (PAH 2015b). The demand for social housing is the one that contests aus-
terity the most, since it seeks to deeply transform Spanish housing policy to the benefit of
households, to the detriment of large-scale asset holders and finance capital and with greater
state involvement in housing provision. It would put housing provision and use value at the core
of housing policy, effectively sealing off parts of the housing stock and households from financial
markets, limiting the scope of housing as a source of profit. By appropriating previously private prop-
erty, a social housing expansion would contest austerity and bolster the welfare state. The appropria-
tion of private property involved is specifically justified by undermining the status of banks as private
actors since they would not exist in their current form had it not been for the state and the bailout.
The fourth demand is to strengthen the protection for tenants through affordable rents and more
secure tenancies. This means reversing the legal changes that have been made to tenancy agree-
ments by extending minimum lengths from three to five years and raising the threshold for the cir-
cumstances under which a landlord can evict a tenant. Moreover, the PAH demands the imposition of
some form of rent regulation, though it is not specified what this would look like (PAH 2015b). The
PAH’s suggested reforms to private renting would limit the profitability in the rental market. They
would put limits to market rents, though not necessarily abolish them. Specifically, they would
strengthen the rights of tenants by reversing the changes that were made to tenancy contracts
under the so called express evictions reforms (Colina Garea 2014). Those reforms were supply-side
reforms seeking to lower the risk and transaction costs of landlords at the expense of tenants and
thereby strengthen the power of the former vis-à-vis the latter. Apart from limiting profitability by
regulating rent levels, the PAH’s proposals would therefore increase transaction costs for landlords
as they would make it more difficult to evict tenants and gain control of the property. The suggested
reforms would also make Spanish housing less appealing for investors, particularly if those investors
aimed to let out the properties, rather than sell them. As homeownership rates have been decreasing
since 2008 (Housing Europe 2015: 84), the rental market is becoming increasingly important, both as
a way for households to secure housing and as a sphere of capital profits. By pushing for stricter regu-
lation in that market, the PAH is contesting the growth of global corporate landlords.
Taken as a totality, the PAH’s demands illustrate that to contest austerity is more than to contest
fiscal adjustment. It includes, but is also more than, demanding an expansion in welfare provisions,
social housing in this case. Contesting austerity is fundamentally about contesting inequality by limit-
ing the power and wealth of finance capital to the benefit of workers, in this case as households. By
seeking to undermine the legitimacy of some of the drivers of austerity through targeted civil disobe-
dience campaigns in support of specific legal changes, the PAH politically contests austerity by con-
testing finance capital as the winners of austerity reforms in Spanish housing.
The closest that the PAH has come to achieving significant legal changes was when their proposals
were accepted by the Catalonian parliament in 2015 and remained law for nine months before being
referred to the constitutional court by the governing right-wing Partido Popular (PP) and later dis-
missed on the grounds that it created too great a difference between Catalonia and the rest of
the country (PAH et al. 2016). Just like the attempt to change the law nationally in 2013, it is then
the national PP government that stands in the way of the PAH’s anti-austerity housing politics. All
other major parties, Podemos, centre-left PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) and centre-right
Ciudadanos, have at various times backed the PAH’s proposals, though they may of course not all
end up doing so if it came to a decisive vote in the national parliament. Would it get that far,
these anti-austerity policies would likely face significant opposition from the troika in a similar way
to what has been experienced by Syriza in Greece. In other words, although the PP as the
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establishment party in Spain has constituted the obstacle until now, there would be other obstacles
to follow unless the troika was to allow European periphery countries to carry out anti-austerity anti-
neoliberal reforms opposite to the austerity reforms enforced so far.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that it is necessary to go beyond a narrow contestation of austerity as fiscal
consolidation and contest actually existing austerity by contesting the vested interests that gain
from it. As shown in relation to the austerity reforms of housing and finance in Spain, that means con-
testing finance capital. The PAH’s suggested legal changes address the dispossession caused through
austerity by directly contesting the interests of finance capital, demanding that financial institutions
pardon the debts of impoverished households and put their empty housing to social use. Were the
PAH’s demands to be realised, it would significantly limit the extent to which housing would work as
a sphere of wealth extraction for finance capital in Spain. By backing up the suggested legal changes
with civil disobedience campaigns directly aimed at Sareb (PAH 2015c) and Blackstone (PAH 2015a),
the PAH contests actually existing austerity by contesting the vested interests that stand to gain from
austerity. In other words, the PAH contests austerity by contesting capital.
Trying to address theworst dispossession that takes place as part of actually existing austeritywithout
contesting the vested interests that gain from the dispossession will achieve little in terms of contesting
austerity. This is visible in the watered down legislation in Catalonia that remained after the central
Spanish government had revokedmost of the legal changes that the PAH had managed to get the Cat-
alonianparliament to pass in 2015 (Baquero 2015, PAH et al. 2016). Catalonia nowhas a law that balances
measures against the worst effects of austerity without a contestation of capital. For Ada Colau, co-
founder of the PAH and now Mayor of Barcelona, this creates a situation where local administrations
are left with the responsibility but without the means to address the housing crisis:
They withdraw the parts of the law that put some of the responsibility on the financial institutions and large-scale
landlords and put an even greater burden on local administrations, who are obliged to find alternative housing.
But they remove the tools to obtain empty housing and remove the tools to put some responsibility on large-
scale landlords and institutions not to evict unless social housing can be offered. (Colau cited Blanchar 2016)
Such a situation captures what housing politics that seek to be anti-austerity without contesting
capital, or anti-poverty but not anti-inequality, look like. It can take a principled stance against aspects
of austerity, such as families being evicted and rendered homeless, but does so by putting all the
onus to solve the situation on the state and none on the banks and vulture funds that have benefited
from austerity. As Colau expresses, this sets the state up to fail, particularly under conditions where
there is external pressure from the troika to continue austerity overall. It illustrates the impossibility of
contesting actually existing austerity without contesting capital or addressing poverty without con-
testing inequality.
The need to contest capital if austerity is to be contested is relevant beyond the case of Spanish
housing politics since it is not only there that actually existing austerity has benefited capital at the
expense of workers. As set out in the opening section, although actually existing austerity has been var-
iegated (Jessop 2015), the claim that it has increased inequality to the benefit of primarily finance capital
stretches beyond Spanish housing. This was shown by Green and Lavery (2015) in how Britain’s ‘regres-
sive recovery’ has benefitted the top five per cent of earners, and particularly finance capital, whilst the
vast majority have suffered stagnation or decrease in disposable income. In other words, there are
winners of austerity and those winners are corporate actors, not least finance capital. If actually existing
austerity is tobe contested, it is not enough to seek towin the argument that fiscal adjustment is counter-
productive and harmful for growth, debt and the living standards of the majority. It is also necessary to
contest the power and wealth of the winners of actually existing austerity.
Anti-austerity political parties and social movements across Europe, including the PAH, show us
that being against austerity is to oppose neoliberalisation and inequality as well as being for more
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direct forms of democracy (see Flesher Fominaya 2015, Hayes 2017). As much as actually existing aus-
terity has been damaging for millions of people across Europe, austerity as a word has helped to
enable the growth of anti-neoliberal political forces in several countries. Few economists, policy-
makers or technocrats describe themselves as neoliberal since neoliberalism only exists in the eyes
of its critics. Although proponents of austerity highlight that austerity is not a choice but a necessity,
they at least acknowledge its existence by promoting it. In other words, there are more people
acknowledging the existence of austerity, though definitions will vary, than there are acknowledging
the existence of neoliberalisation. Being anti-austerity is in this sense different from being anti-neo-
liberal, anti-capitalist or anti-globalisation, all of which are labels that have been used by, or ascribed
to, activists or supporters of the left. The first lacks political potency since there are no self-ascribed
neoliberals. The meaning of the second was hollowed with the end of actually existing socialism and
politically marginalised. The third – connected with the large protests against institutions of global
governance around the turn of the millennium and later with the World Social Forum and the
Global Justice Movement (Flesher Fominaya and Cox 2013, Smith et al. 2014) – struggled with that
globalisation sounds like something positive to many and the epithet was therefore often
changed to anti-neoliberal globalisation (Seoane and Taddei 2002). In contrast, with the lack of
unequivocal support from economists and international institutions and with increasing poverty
and inequality, austerity is more appealing and possible to oppose. It is therefore more politically
acceptable to be anti-austerity than anti-neoliberal or anti-capitalist.
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